Naturalism and Its Challenges
طبعی گرایی فلسفی و چالش‌های آن

05-09 March 2022
05 March: Invited Speakers (Persian)
06-08 March: Invited Speakers (English)
09 March: Accepted Abstracts (English)

Invited Speakers (English):
Simon Blackburn
Paul Boghossian
Quassim Cassam
Anjan Chakravartty
Daniel C. Dennett
Heather Dyke
Anandi Hattiangadi
Paul Horwich
Daniel D. Hutto
Peter Hylton
Gary Kemp
Hilary Kornblith
Stephen Law
H. Muhammad Legenhausen
Cathy Legg
Brian Leiter
Helen Longino
Victoria McGeer
Kourken Michaelian
Alex Miller
Stephen Mumford
Graham Oppy
David Papineau
Philip Pettit
Diane Proudfoot
Isidora Stojanovic
Peter Van Inwagen
Timothy Williamson
Nick Zangwill

Invited Speakers (Persian):
Hamed Bikaran-Behesti
Meyyam Mohammad Amini
Seyed N. Mousavian
Narges Nazarnnejad
Shahram Pazouki
Aboutorab Yaghmaie
Zahra Zargar

Accepted Abstracts (English):
Jessica D. Bicking
Tony Cheng
Omid Karimizadeh
Kerim Can Kirac
Franco Manni
Mousa Mohammadian
Petar Nurkić
Justin Peterson Holder
Justin Remhof
Thomas J. Spiegel
Tomasz Stefaniuk
Ozer Turkur

The Scientific & Organizing Coordinators:
Hossein Sheykh Rezaee
Ali Hossein Khani
Hassan Amidiriara

Conference Links:
https://www.irip.ac.ir/u/133 (Conference Room)
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https://instagram.com/irip.ac.ir (Broadcast Only)

Timetable & Abstracts:
naturalism.irip.ac.ir
The International Conference on Naturalism and Its Challenges (ICNIC)

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Hassan Amiriara, Iranian Institute of Philosophy (IRIP)
Ebrahim Azadegan, Sharif University of Technology
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Hassan Mianzadi, Iranian Institute of Philosophy (IRIP)
Kourken Michaelian, Centre for Philosophy of Memory, the Université Grenoble Alpes
Alexander Miller, University of Otago
Meyyam Mohammad Amini, Shahid Beheshti University
Jafar Morvarid, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad (FUM)
Mahmoud Morvarid, Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (IPM)
Reza Mosmer, Institute for Cognitive Science Studies
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Fereshte Nabati, Allameh Tabatabaie University
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Amirhossein Zadyousefi, Tarbiat Modares University
Gholamreza Zakiani, Allameh Tabatabaie University
Mohsen Zamani, Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (IPM)

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The Organizing Coordinators: Hassan Amiriara – Ali Hossein Khani
The Administrative Assistants: Saeed Makhani – Hossein Rostami Jallilian

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Timetable
سید نصرالله موسویان
Seyed N. Mousavian
Loyola University Chicago
طبیعی گرایی درباره دربارگی
Naturalizing “Aboutness”
۱۴۰۰-۱۱-۱۰ (تهران)
۰۶:۳۰-۰۷:۳۰ (GMT)

امحمدحسین شریفی
Ahmad-Hossein Sharifi
رئیس مؤسسه بروهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایران
۱۴۰۰-۰۹-۱۰ (تهران)
۰۵:۳۰-۰۶:۳۰ (GMT)

امروزاب یغمایی
Aboutorab Yaghmaie
دانشگاه شهید بهشتی
صاروت طبیعی‌شده
Becoming Naturalized
۱۴۰۰-۱۱-۱۱:۱۵ (تهران)
۰۷:۴۵-۰۸:۴۵ (GMT)

حامد بیکاران بهشتی
Hamed Bikaraan-Behesht
مرکز تحقیقات سیاست علمی کشور
آیا طبیعت گرایی روش شناختی موجه است؟
Is Methodological Naturalism Justified?
۱۴۰۰-۱۳:۳۰-۱۴:۳۰ (تهران)
۱۰:۰۰-۱۱:۰۰ (GMT)

نورگس نظرزاد
Narges Nazarnejad
دانشگاه الزهرا
طبیعی گرایی و امکان معرفت از منظر الون پلننگایی
Plantinga on Naturalism and the Possibility of Knowledge
۱۴۰۰-۱۱-۱۷:۴۵-۱۸:۴۵ (تهران)
۱۴:۱۵-۱۵:۱۵ (GMT)
March 06th, 2022
Sunday

Graham Oppy
Monash University
What Is Naturalism?
09:00–10:00 (Tehran)
05:30–06:30 (GMT)

Diane Proudfoot
University of Canterbury
Naturalizing Intelligence, Turing-Style
10:00–11:00 (Tehran)
06:30–07:30 (GMT)

BREAK
11:00–11:15 (Tehran) / 07:30–07:45 (GMT)

Cathy Legg
Deakin University
Naturalizing Intellectualism: A Peircean Pragmatist Account
11:15–12:15 (Tehran)
07:45–08:45 (GMT)

LUNCH
12:15–13:30 (Tehran) / 08:45–10:00 (GMT)

Gary Kemp
University of Glasgow
Naturalism and the Dissemination of Knowledge
14:30–15:30 (Tehran)
11:00–12:00 (GMT)

Tim Williamson
Oxford University
Naturalism and Mathematics
13:30–14:30 (Tehran)
10:00–11:00 (GMT)

BREAK
15:30–15:45 (Tehran) / 12:00–12:15 (GMT)

Hillary Kornblith
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
A Naturalistic Approach to Moral Epistemology
16:45–17:45 (Tehran)
13:15–14:15 (GMT)

Stephen Law
Oxford University
Must Atheists and Humanists Be Committed to Naturalism?
15:45–16:45 (Tehran)
12:15–13:15 (GMT)

BREAK
17:45–18:00 (Tehran) / 14:15–14:30 (GMT)

Brian Leiter
University of Chicago
Nietzsche’s Naturalism
19:00–20:00 (Tehran)
15:30–16:30 (GMT)

Anjan Chakravartty
University of Miami
Naturalizing Scientific Metaphysics: Epistemological Challenges
18:00–19:00 (Tehran)
14:30–15:30 (GMT)
March 07th, 2022

Monday

Alex Miller
*University of Otago*
Kripkenstein’s Monster is Alive and Well!
09:00–10:00 (Tehran)
05:30–06:30 (GMT)

Daniel Hutto
*University of Wollongong*
Naturalism – Why be Relaxed?
10:00–11:00 (Tehran)
06:30–07:30 (GMT)

Kirk Michiealson
*Université Grenoble Alpes*
Against Perrin’s Embodied Causalism: Still No Evidence for the Necessity of Appropriate Causation
11:15–12:15 (Tehran)
07:45–08:45 (GMT)

LUNCH
12:15–13:30 (Tehran) / 08:45–10:00 (GMT)

Nick Zangwill
*University College London*
Propositional Attitudes and Normative Essences
14:30–15:30 (Tehran)
11:00–12:00 (GMT)

Isidora Stojanovic
*Institut Jean Nicod*
Valence Asymmetries in Thick Terms
13:30–14:30 (Tehran)
10:00–11:00 (GMT)

Paul Boghossian
*New York University*
Normativity’s Challenge to Naturalism
16:45–17:45 (Tehran)
13:15–14:15 (GMT)

Quassim Cassam
*University of Warwick*
Epistemology Radicalized
15:45–16:45 (Tehran)
12:15–13:15 (GMT)

Peter Hylton
*University of Illinois, Chicago*
Naturalism and Tolerance
19:00–20:00 (Tehran)
15:30–16:30 (GMT)

Paul Horwich
*New York University*
Naturalism and the ‘Linguistic Turn’
18:00–19:00 (Tehran)
14:30–15:30 (GMT)

Helen Longino
*Stanford University*
What Sort of Naturalism Should We Pursue?
20:00–21:00 (Tehran)
16:30–17:30 (GMT)
March 08th, 2022

Tuesday

Philip Pettit
Australian National University
Judgment, Reasoning and Naturalism
09:00–10:00 (Tehran)
05:30–06:30 (GMT)

Heather Dyke
University of Otago
Naturalising the Philosophy of Time
10:00–11:00 (Tehran)
06:30–07:30 (GMT)

Victoria McGeer
Australian National University
Making Responsible: The Shaping of Moral Capacities
11:15–12:15 (Tehran)
07:45–08:45 (GMT)

LUNCH
12:15–13:30 (Tehran) / 08:45–10:00 (GMT)

Stephen Mumford
Durham University
Naturalistic Emergence
14:30–15:30 (Tehran)
11:00–12:00 (GMT)

Simon Blackburn
Cambridge University
Pragmatism as an Offshoot of Naturalism
13:30–14:30 (Tehran)
10:00–11:00 (GMT)

Peter Van Inwagen
University of Notre Dame
Considerations on Naturalism
15:45–16:45 (Tehran)
12:15–13:15 (GMT)

Anandi Hattiangadi
Stockholm University
Norms, Normativity, and Naturalism
18:00–19:00 (Tehran)
14:30–15:30 (GMT)

Daniel Dennett
Tufts University
Choosing Naturalism as a Starting Point
19:00–20:00 (Tehran)
15:30–16:30 (GMT)

David Papineau
King’s College London
Quine and Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism
20:00–21:00 (Tehran)
16:30–17:30 (GMT)

Hajj Muhammad Legenhausen
Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute
The Islamicization of Naturalism
20:00–21:00 (Tehran)
16:30–17:30 (GMT)
March 09th, 2022

Wednesday

Tony Cheng
National Chengchi University
McDowellian Naturalism and Strong Emergence
09:00–09:30 (Tehran)
05:30–06:00 (GMT)

Thomas J. Spiegel
University of Potsdam
Why Naturalism Cannot (Merely) Be an Attitude
10:30–11:00 (Tehran)
07:00–07:30 (GMT)

BREAK
11:00–11:30 (Tehran) / 07:30–08:00 (GMT)

Petar Nurkić
University of Belgrade
What Does Lassie Know? Cognitive Ethology and Epistemic Games
11:30–12:00 (Tehran)
08:00–08:30 (GMT)

Jessica D. Bicking
University of Vienna
MIND THE GAP: The Explanatory Gap and the Promise of Applied Phenomenology in the Cognitive Sciences
13:00–13:30 (Tehran)
09:30–10:00 (GMT)

Ozer Turker
University of Western Ontario
Why Must an Adequate Naturalism Accommodate Substantial Normative Notions?
16:30–17:00 (Tehran)
13:00–13:30 (GMT)

BREAK
17:00–17:30 (Tehran) / 13:30–14:00 (GMT)

Mousa Mohammadian
Ahmedabad University
Theoretical Virtue in Science and Metaphysics: A Proposal for Naturalized Metaphysics
18:15–18:45 (Tehran)
14:45–15:15 (GMT)

Justin Remhof
Old Dominion University
Introducing Nietzsche’s Naturalized Metaphysics
17:30–18:00 (Tehran)
14:00–14:30 (GMT)

Omid Karimzadeh
Shahid Beheshti University
Moore’s Open Question Argument and Intension-Extension Conflation
19:00–19:30 (Tehran)
15:30–16:00 (GMT)
Abstracts
Abstract:
In this talk, I offer an account of naturalism as a view about causal domains. I tie my account of what is natural to well-established science. This might seem to invite a question about what exactly counts as well-established science: current well-established science or completed (ideal) well-established science. I argue that, since current well-established science is our best guide to completed well-established science, there is no serious choice that faces us at this point. Given that current well-established science gives us no reason to suppose that there are non-natural causal entities and/or non-natural instantiated causal properties, we currently have no reason to suppose that completed well-established science will be committed to non-natural causal entities and/or non-natural instantiated causal properties. Perhaps we might be wrong; but, at most, this entails a sensible fallibilism concerning what is clearly the best position for us to adopt. Committing to particular non-natural causal entities and/or particular non-natural instantiated causal properties -- or even committing to there being non-natural causal entities and or non-natural instantiated causal properties -- would be to take an obviously inferior theoretical option.
Abstract:
The modern project of naturalizing intelligence began in the middle of last century, and Alan Turing is one of its most celebrated proponents. The assumption that Turing shared the ontological and methodological commitments of canonical naturalists is based on two widespread beliefs—that Turing endorsed a computational theory of mind, and that his imitation game provides a behaviourist criterion of intelligence. In my view, both these prevalent beliefs are false. Turing is not the naturalist he is assumed to be—but a naturalist he is, of a novel and subtle sort. Intelligence, he said, is an ‘emotional concept’. Naturalizing intelligence Turing-style avoids objections to naturalism that really target specific computationalist theories or behaviourism. Yet does his claim that intelligence is an ‘emotional concept’ commit Turing, the naturalist scientist and philosopher, to subjectivism or other form of anti-realism—a philosophical stance that is anathema to naturalists?
Naturalizing Intellectualism: A Peircean Pragmatist Account

Catherine Legg
Deakin University

Abstract:
Charles Peirce’s habit-based account of cognition is increasingly being recognized as a valuable resource for clarifying new directions in epistemology and philosophy of mind. Although it seems fairly clear how such an account can unify ‘knowing-that’ with ‘knowing how’ for simple beliefs about the immediate environment, such as “There is orange juice in the fridge”, many questions remain concerning how such an account can operationalize the full space of reasons, including ‘higher-order’ and ‘offline’ cognition. This presentation sketches the beginnings of a Peircean account of these things. I propose to analyse every inference into three fundamental elements: i) a cue, ii) an act (actual or imagined), iii) an expectation schema (for the consequences of that act given that cue). Together, these elements constitute the agentive anatomy of all deliberately cultivated habits, including intellectual habits. I will argue that this analysis derived from classical pragmatism suggests a new ‘liberal naturalist’ approach to cognition that is non-materialistic and yet highly congenial to recent empirical work in the mind sciences.
Naturalism and Mathematics

Timothy Williamson
Oxford University
Sun, March 06th, 2022
13:30–14:30 (Tehran) / 10:00–11:00 (GMT)

Abstract:
The term “naturalism” is ambiguous, partly because the term “science” is ambiguous between “natural science” and a wider sense also applicable to mathematics, history, and even philosophy as non-natural sciences. In the narrow sense, naturalism is poorly motivated, both ontologically and methodologically. Nevertheless, the difference between mathematical cognition and sensory cognition are often exaggerated.
Naturalism and the Dissemination of Knowledge

Gary Kemp
University of Glasgow
Sun, March 06th, 2022
14:30–15:30 (Tehran) / 11:00–12:00 (GMT)

Abstract:
I propose an alternative to Quine’s notion of an observation sentence, and suggest that it makes better sense not only of communication, but of the idea that knowledge is a collective product, not an individual one.
Must Atheists and Humanists Be Committed to Naturalism?

Stephen Law
Oxford University
Sun, March 06\textsuperscript{th}, 2022
15:45–16:45 (Tehran) / 12:15–13:15 (GMT)

Abstract:
I am an atheist and humanist, but I am unsure about naturalism. It seems to me that many religious people assume that atheists disbelieve because they are naturalists, and that atheists must certainly be committed to naturalism (whether or not their naturalism is what motivates their atheism). Consequently, they believe they can refute atheism by refuting naturalism. I will explain why I believe none of these assumptions is actually correct.
A Naturalistic Approach to Moral Epistemology

Hilary Kornblith
University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Sun, March 06th, 2022
16:45–17:45 (Tehran) / 13:15–14:15 (GMT)

Abstract:
This paper will present an outline of some features of a naturalistic approach to moral epistemology. Just as the naturalist approaches non-moral knowledge as a robust phenomenon capable of empirical study, we may view moral knowledge in a similar manner. While many moral issues are matters of great dispute, there is a vast realm of deeply uncontroversial moral knowledge and we may profitably inquire as to how it is that we are in a position to gain such knowledge. Some empirical work on the origins of moral knowledge will be explored, along with some of its implications for similarities and differences between adult human beings and non-human animals.
Naturalizing Scientific Metaphysics: Epistemological Challenges

Anjan Chakravartty
University of Miami
Sun, March 06th, 2022
18:00–19:00 (Tehran) / 14:30–15:30 (GMT)

Abstract:
Under headings such as ‘naturalized metaphysics’, ‘scientific metaphysics’, and ‘the metaphysics of science’, recent work in the philosophy of science has endeavored to articulate conceptions of metaphysical theorizing in relation to the sciences that respect what many regard as the superior epistemic credentials of the latter. Of course, this task is hardly new, having storied antecedents in the recent history of philosophy, in approaches to thinking about how otherwise purely metaphysical discourse might be linked to or accredited by modern science. I consider some epistemological challenges to the very idea of “naturalizing” in this context. Some concern the identification of plausible criteria by which theorizing counts as naturalized; others concern how well, exactly, a domain of theorizing must satisfy these criteria in order to count. I conclude by outlining my own approach to grappling with these challenges, in terms of a voluntarist epistemology applied to metaphysical theorizing about and within the sciences.
Abstract:

It is no longer controversial that Nietzsche is some kind of philosophical naturalist, a view I defended starting in the 1990s when it was rather unfashionable, due to the influence of Heidegger, Derrida, and others. Yet by 2007, one scholar could write: “Most commentators on Nietzsche would agree that he is in a broad sense a naturalist in his mature philosophy.” Nietzsche is a naturalist not only in the sense that he rejects the supernatural (e.g., gods) (as any naturalist must); he also rejects physicalism (not everything that exists is physical). Nietzsche is a “methodological” naturalist, who countenances the reality only of that which is explicable by the various Wissenschaften (sciences). And these sciences, on Nietzsche’s view, undermine the objectivity (or mind- or attitude-independence) of values, the first-person point of view, and much of our common-sense or “folk” picture of the world. Recent “liberal naturalists” with their tolerance for objective values and reasons, and much of the “manifest image,” are from Nietzsche’s standpoint still in thrall to the same impulses that gave us belief in God: they want human beings to be “special,” while Nietzsche says the philosopher’s task is to repudiate the “dignified verbal pageantry” and “the false old finery, debris, and gold dust of unconscious human vanity.”
Kripkenstein’s Monster is Alive and Well!

Alex Miller
University of Otago
Mon, March 07th, 2022
09:00–10:00 (Tehran) / 05:30–06:30 (GMT)

Abstract:
Saul Kripke’s discussion of meaning and rule-following in *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* is rightly celebrated for the challenge to naturalism about meaning it poses via its attack on dispositionalist accounts of meaning. In his recent paper, “Killing Kripkenstein’s Monster”, Jared Warren attempts to undermine the various strands – relating to finitude, error, and normativity – in Kripke’s challenge to dispositionalism. In this talk, I’ll cast a critical eye on Warren’s sophisticated and stimulating arguments. I’ll tentatively conclude that their ingenuity notwithstanding, Kripkenstein’s monster is alive and well.
Naturalism – Why be Relaxed?

Daniel Hutto
University of Wollongong

Abstract:
This presentation explicates what adopting a relaxed stance on the philosophy of nature involves; what motivates adopting such a stance; and why a relaxed stance is attractive compared to its rivals – namely, exclusively scientific naturalism and liberal naturalism. Relaxed naturalism adopts the view that, given what we now know, there is good reason to think that we require a plurality of methods if we are to adequately understand and characterise nature. In particular, it is argued that constructing an adequate philosophy of nature requires liberating our thinking about the nature of philosophy itself, freeing it from purely scientistic conceptions. Relaxed naturalists embrace an fallibilist spirit of inquiry, allowing that our assumptions, methods and findings are always to open challenge. In this, it avoids vacuity and the dogmatic foreclosing of possibilities, typical of its rivals, while also guarding against an overly promiscuous pluralism according to which anything and everything goes.
Abstract:
Perrin (2021) has two main goals. First, to attack the simulation theory of memory on its empirical home turf. Second, to defend a novel embodied causal theory of memory designed to avoid the empirical difficulties that beset both the classical causal theory of memory and — if Perrin is right — the simulation theory of memory. In pursuit of his first goal, Perrin argues that the empirical evidence to which simulationists appeal does not in fact support simulationism. In pursuit of his second goal, he argues that that very evidence supports causalism in general and, moreover, that additional empirical evidence supports an embodied form of causalism in particular. This talk likewise has two goals. First, to critique Perrin’s attempt to show that the evidence to which simulationists appeal supports causalism rather than simulationism. Second, to show that, regardless of whether Perrin is successful with respect to his first purpose, he is unsuccessful with respect to his second -- to show, that is, that the additional evidence that he adduces fails to provide any support for the necessity of the sort of embodied appropriate causation that figures in the embodied causal theory. If the talk achieves its two goals, embodied causalism is in the same empirically-leaky boat as more traditional forms of causalism, and the empirical evidence continues to favour simulationism over causalism.
Valence Asymmetries in Thick Terms

Isidora Stojanovic
Institut Jean Nicod
Mon, March 07th, 2022
13:30–14:30 (Tehran) / 10:00–11:00 (GMT)

Abstract:
In the first part of the talk, I present evidence from different disciplines (philosophy, linguistics, psychology) that converges toward the observation that positive thick terms and concepts (generous, honest) and negative ones (selfish, dishonest) behave differently in certain respects. In the second part, I suggest that this could be, at least prima facie, a problem for naturalism, and I explore the prospects of a naturalistic account of the observed asymmetries.
**Propositional Attitudes and Normative Essences**

Nick Zangwill  
University College London  
Mon, March 07th, 2022  
14:30–15:30 (Tehran) / 11:00–12:00 (GMT)

Abstract:
I consider the nature of propositional attitudes and what essentially distinguishes them from each other. I distinguish vertical (mind-world) and horizontal (mind-mind) accounts. First, vertical normative and non-normative accounts are rejected. Then I argue against horizontal non-normative accounts, such as dispositional or second-order accounts. Normative horizontal accounts are preferable given the difficulties for non-normative horizontal accounts. Lastly, I argue that an intrinsic account is superior to both vertical and horizontal accounts, normative or non-normative, because it is more explanatorily basic.
Abstract:
Nearly thirty years ago, Louise Antony drew attention to the radical import of naturalized epistemology. Her aim was to highlight the virtues of naturalized epistemology from a feminist point of view. To the extent that naturalized epistemology sees knowledge as socially mediated, it encourages epistemologists to take seriously the impact of gender on knowledge and ignorance, as well as the impact of race and class. The result is what I will call a radicalized epistemology. I will develop the notion of a radicalized epistemology, explore the relationship between radicalized and naturalized epistemology, and discuss Antony’s suggestion that there is no antipathy between radicalism and the methods and aims of mainstream epistemology. I will end by considering whether epistemology can or should have a political agenda and what that agenda should be.
Normativity’s Challenge to Naturalism

Paul Boghossian
New York University
Mon, March 07th, 2022
16:45–17:45 (Tehran) / 13:15–14:15 (GMT)

Abstract:
In this programmatic talk, I will sketch an argument for three large claims. The first two are: (Absolutism) If there are normative facts, then at least some of them are absolute – i.e., non-relative.

(Objectivism) If there are normative facts, then at least some of them are objective – i.e., mind-independent.

In other words, neither relativistic, nor mind-dependence, forms of anti-realism about the normative are true. Even if my arguments are successful in establishing these two theses, that would not by itself vindicate a Realism about the normative: that there are mind-independent, absolute normative facts. The two theses, as I have them, leave it open that an Error Theory (Nihilism) about the normative is true, according to which there are no normative facts of any stripe. I will close by indicating why I believe that Nihilism is also not likely to be a viable option, and that will be my third thesis:

(Anti-Nihilism) There are some normative facts.
Naturalism and the ‘Linguistic Turn’

Paul Horwich
New York University
Mon, March 07th, 2022
18:00–19:00 (Tehran) / 14:30–15:30 (GMT)

Abstract:
Modern scientific knowledge is an amazing creation – humanity’s greatest achievement, perhaps – and we are right to be profoundly impressed by it. However, as with all magnificent things, there’s a danger of being mesmerized. Our respect for science can become distorted in various ways.

Amongst the most philosophically important of these, it seems to me, are the following questionable doctrines:

• Science encompasses everything there is. Fully rational belief can emerge only from the scientific method. And all facts can in principle figure in scientific explanations: either as explainers of things, or as things that are explained, or as both. (“Naturalism”)

• There’s no such thing as a priori knowledge. – In other words, all knowledge is based on observational data. (“Empiricism”)

• A priori theorizing can and should be governed by goals and methods paralleling those of science. (“Theoretical philosophy”)

Evidently (and unsurprisingly) these doctrines are not entirely consistent with one another.

My presentation today will focus on the first of these ‘scientistic’ errors: namely, naturalism (although the other two – the dismissal of a priori knowledge, or an aping of science in aprioristic philosophizing – will both come into the story). But I plan to assess not merely the plausibility of the naturalist’s thesis, but also the proper methodology to be deployed in arguing for or against it. More specifically, I will consider (with primary reference to Wittgenstein’s conception of the subject) the question of whether such arguments vindicate any of philosophy ‘linguistic turns’.

My main conclusions will be: first, that naturalism is an irrational overgeneralization; and second, that whereas the grounds for this critique fail to square with the extreme idea that metaphysics is a mere projection of language, it supports the later Wittgenstein’s less radical linguistic turn – his idea that, since reasoning about philosophical matters is especially prone to confusion, linguo-conceptual self-consciousness in this area is of paramount importance.
Naturalism and Tolerance

Peter Hylton
University of Illinois, Chicago
Mon, March 07th, 2022
19:00–20:00 (Tehran) / 15:30–16:30 (GMT)

Abstract:
In this talk I discuss Quine’s naturalism and consider whether Carnap should also be counted as a naturalist. I argue that he is not a naturalist, at least not in anything like the sense in which Quine is; I also argue that what makes the crucial difference is Carnap’s Principle of Tolerance.
What Sort of Naturalism Should We Pursue?

Helen Longino
Stanford University
Mon, March 07th, 2022
20:00–21:00 (Tehran) / 16:30–17:30 (GMT)

Abstract:
This talk explores what naturalism in philosophy might mean. Is philosophy an extension of the empirical sciences or does it stand in a different relation to them? How is the critical spirit of philosophy preserved within a naturalist orientation?
Abstract:
Let naturalism be the view that the materials and forces that obtain in the universe are ultimately of a kind with those recognized in physics. Apart from consciousness, the major challenge it faces is the spontaneity of human mentality: the capacity of the human mind to take intentional steps to manage its own operations in judgment and reasoning. This paper sketches a naturalistic explanation of this capacity.
Abstract:

In the debate between the A-theory and the B-theory it is generally agreed on all sides that the B-theory, unlike the A-theory, is at least consistent with what physics tells us about time. The B-theory therefore looks to be the best candidate for a naturalistic metaphysical theory of time. However, the B-theory is prima facie inconsistent with our ordinary experience of time, which tells us that there is a privileged present moment, and that time flows. In this paper I argue that the B-theory can incorporate a naturalistic account of our ordinary temporal experience, and so offers a complete, naturalised metaphysics of time that coheres with both physics and temporal experience.
Abstract:
On a standard Strawsonian view of moral responsibility, agents are fit to be held responsible so far as they have a capacity to respond (understand and be motivated by) moral reasons. I endorse this basic picture, but with amendments. On the standard approach, this involves an on/off enduring capacity, dispositionally understood, to respond to moral reasons. I raise problems for this approach, focusing on the fact that capacities of the required kind are essentially ‘fragile’, requiring feedback and reinforcement from others to develop and sustain. Reactive attitudes and practices play this crucial scaffolding role. While this alternative picture is naturalistically attractive, it raises problems of its own regarding who is properly exempted from being held responsible. The talk concludes by addressing these problems.
Pragmatism as an Offshoot of Naturalism

Simon Blackburn
Cambridge University

Tue, March 08th, 2022
13:30–14:30 (Tehran) / 10:00–11:00 (GMT)

Abstract:
Both these terms are imprecise, but there are more or less useful ways of putting some precision into them. So: by naturalism I will understand the doctrine that human beings are parts of nature, subject to exactly the same kinds of causation as other parts of nature. The laws governing our histories and evolutions are the same as the laws governing other natural system. By pragmatism I understand an emphasis on the evolutionary and historical factors that have brought about our ways of thinking about the world and our place in it. In my paper I shall try to illustrate the links between these orientations, both of which I share.
Abstract:
Emergentism is often depicted as anathema to science, for two reasons. One is that strong emergence is defined in terms of in-principle unpredictability and inexplicability of the emergent phenomena. The other is that it allows for the possibility of downward causation that seemingly would threaten the causal closure of the physical. For these reasons, there is a suspicion that emergentism is anti-naturalistic. However, it is possible to defend a perfectly naturalistic theory that would properly qualify as strongly emergent, where emergent phenomena can be subjects of scientific investigation and explanation. If so, this shows that we should understand the issue of causal closure in a new light and a rejection of the principle would be far less threatening to science than we are usually led to believe.
Abstract:
In *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* (1982), Kripke famously claims that meaning is normative. This claim has been widely interpreted to mean that meaning is ‘categorically prescriptive’, in part because Kripke suggests that it plays a key role in his objections to semantic naturalism—the view that the meaning facts are reducible to the natural facts—and it has seemed to many that it is only if meaning is categorically prescriptive that an argument against semantic naturalism is in the offing. The thought has been that: (i) if meaning is normative merely in the weak sense that it involves norms, then the objections Kripke raises against semantic naturalism could be resisted by appeal to familiar forms of metaethical naturalism; and (ii) if meaning merely involves norms, then the objections Kripke raises provide no basis for a general argument against semantic naturalism.

Though I have previously subscribed to the foregoing line of reasoning (Hattiangadi 2007), my aim in this paper is to reexamine—and ultimately reject—(i) and (ii). First, I will argue that semantic naturalists cannot appeal to metaethical naturalism to reduce semantic norms, because the familiar forms of metaethical naturalism invoke semantic and intentional facts in their reductive accounts of the normative. Thus, appeals to metaethical naturalism are likely to violate a plausible circularity constraint on semantic naturalism. Second, building on Kripkean themes, I will put forward an argument against semantic naturalism that assumes no more than the weak thesis that meaning involves norms.
Considerations on Naturalism

Peter Van Inwagen
University of Notre Dame

Tue, March 08th, 2022
16:45–17:45 (Tehran) / 13:15–14:15 (GMT)

Abstract:
Epistemological and ontological definitions of naturalism are considered, and it is argued that the ontological definitions are preferable. The following ontological definition is endorsed. Naturalism comprises the following theses: that everything (concrete) there is is composed of certain fundamental entities; that fundamental entities are mereologically simple, and wholly without mental or teleological properties; that the truth-value of every proposition supervenes on the intrinsic properties of and relations that hold among the fundamental entities conjoined with the proposition that everything (concrete) is composed of fundamental entities. The relation of naturalism to the following concepts and topics will be considered: property dualism; theism; supernaturalism; ethical intuitionism; miracles; magic; the simulation hypothesis.
Abstract:
Quine is rightly regarded as the originator of modern philosophical naturalism. However contemporary naturalist orthodoxy differs from Quine on a number of issues, including meaning, mental states, abstract objects, and metaphysical realism. I shall examine these differences and ask why contemporary naturalism has seen fit to move beyond Quine.
Abstract:
If we adopt the familiar perspective of scientific and medical and historical realism—the world of everyday things is real, and the scientific world of molecules and atoms is real—then stable solutions can be found to the major philosophical problems of consciousness, meaning, and free will, and these accounts owe more to biology than to physics. The beginning of life is the beginning of reasons and meaning and information (in one of its most important senses); human brains have been turned into minds by the products of cultural evolution, of memes, not genes; and consciousness creates the user-illusion of a Self or Central Meaner, which is not a part of the brain but better seen as a useful abstraction: the Center of Narrative Gravity. Selves are as real as such other useful abstractions as dollars. The key step that makes this perspective fruitful is abandoning the almost irresistible conviction (going back to Descartes) that we know our own minds better than we know the ‘external’ world.
Abstract:
Naturalism is typically divided into ontological and methodological varieties. Ontological naturalism is a view that excludes whatever is not natural from existence; and a major target of the early naturalists was the supernatural. So, ontological naturalism was devised in such a manner as to be incompatible with most religious belief systems. It was because of this that methodological naturalism was introduced. The methods of the natural sciences could be extolled while retaining belief in supernatural entities. Like ontological naturalism, however, methodological naturalism clashes with religious beliefs if it is taken to imply that knowledge and understanding are exclusively obtained through the methods of the natural sciences. Exclusivist methodological naturalism is referred to as epistemological naturalism. Both ontological and epistemological forms of naturalism are what Huw Price has called object naturalism, and which he contrasts with subject naturalism. Subject naturalism considers the subject, that is the user of language and concepts, as natural, and investigates how subjects use their languages and conceptual tools to engage in different areas of discourse and inquiry. What subject naturalism and object naturalism have in common, is that both defer to the findings of science, as the scientific study of human linguistic behavior and conceptual psychology in the case of subject naturalism, or as the determinants of ontological and epistemological acceptability, in the case of object naturalism, ontological and epistemological, respectively. Each of these forms of naturalism will be explored with the aim of finding formulations that are compatible with religious beliefs, particularly, those of Islam. If, as Price suggests, naturalism in essence is deference to the findings of natural science, we can find ample examples of such deference in Islamic intellectual traditions, but without denials of the existence of God, angels, or the miraculous, and without taking the methodology of the natural sciences to be appropriate to all areas of inquiry, and without taking the user of language and concepts to be nothing more than that. It is argued that forms of naturalism that remain compatible with Islamic doctrine may be considered Islamicized naturalisms.
McDowellian Naturalism and Strong Emergence

Tony Cheng
National Chengchi University

Wed, March 09th, 2022
09:00–09:30 (Tehran) / 05:30–06:00 (GMT)

Abstract:
Metaphysical naturalism has been the dominant strand since the mid-20th century (e.g., Quine, 1981), though the exact formulation of it has been heatedly disputed (Papineau, 2007/2020). Often it is discussed with its kin physicalism and materialism, though these terms have different connotations and theoretical baggage (Stoljar, 2010). In recent years, a relative consensus amongst the Anglo-Saxon tradition seems to be this: metaphysical naturalism should take the form of certain version of physicalism, and details aside, some form of physicalism has to be right (Kim, 2011). One prominent exception is John McDowell's variant: accumulated in his seminal work *Mind and World* (1996a), he has been arguing for a relaxed version of naturalism, which denies physicalism (1996b; for discussions, see e.g., Fink, 2006; Toner, 2008). This variant has not been taken seriously in the naturalism literature, partly because McDowell's writing style is idiosyncratic, and his works involve elements in continental philosophy, notably German Idealism and hermeneutics (e.g., 1996a, 2003). To remedy this, there are two aims of this paper. The first is to explain why Hans-Georg Gadamer's distinction between environment and world (1960/2004) is essential in understanding McDowell's relaxed naturalism; the second is to explain how contemporary analytic metaphysics can help cash out a crucial missing piece in McDowell's writings, i.e., strong emergence (O’Conner, 2020; Wilson, 2021).
A Strong Emergentist View on Naturalism: A Unifying Picture Without Physicalism

Kerim Can Kıraç
Boğaziçi University

Abstract:
Naturalism has typically been entangled with a physicalist view. Physicalism, on the other hand, falls short of accounting for qualitative states of mental phenomena. The hard problem of consciousness seems to be a natural epistemic boundary in such a way that we do not even have any conceptualization as to how we can possibly account for mental states in physicalist terms in the future, which leads us to some version of causal/ontological plurality in the sense that it does not seem possible to explain everything with the same parameters even though the world fundamentally consists in a single substance. If plurality in multiple levels of scientific explanation is necessary, I argue that strong emergentism is the best candidate to account for this fact, as a metaphysical framework. I will also tackle two major physicalist views by Kim and Sider. Kim shows us that non-reductive physicalism is a bankrupt project whereas Sider’s physicalism that postulate a pure and complete fundamental level renders higher-level phenomena (including mental reality) metaphysically spurious. These are the main reasons why I conclude that our revised naturalism should be disentangled from physicalism and embrace the causal/ontological plurality of strong emergentism without falling for substance dualism.
Abstract:
In this talk, I argue that recent attempts at reformulating naturalism as an attitude (in order to avoid the traditional problems of scientific naturalism) fail. Various forms of ontological and methodological naturalism are among the most popular theses in contemporary philosophy. However, each of these theses faces a different dilemma: ontological naturalism is famously challenged by Hempel’s dilemma, while methodological naturalism faces issues regarding its coherence. This paper argues that attitude accounts are unsuccessful due to a third dilemma: naturalism as an attitude either collapses into a thesis again or is rationally unjustifiable.

According to the first horn of this third dilemma, naturalism is unstable as an attitude. This is because the content of an attitude can simply be reformulated as a thesis. But once the content of naturalism as an attitude has been reformulated as a thesis, naturalism itself becomes susceptible again to either of the preceding dilemmas, i.e. Hempel’s dilemma or the coherence dilemma. And then, the naturalist would be back where they started.

The second horn of this third dilemma arises if the naturalist somehow were to insist or demonstrate that naturalism can only be formulated as an attitude (thereby resisting the first horn in some way). The naturalist would most likely have to do this by resisting calls to justify the naturalistic attitude or disposition in the first place. For if the naturalist does not even utter the contents of the attitude or disposition in question, their expression and justification cannot be used in a reformulation as a thesis, which would put a stop to the regression from naturalism as an attitude to naturalism as a thesis.
Abstract:
From Quine’s turn to naturalistic epistemology, the concept of knowledge has ceased to be the main focus of epistemic interest (Quine, 1969). The traditional definition of knowledge has proved unsuccessful in providing solutions to fundamental epistemic problems. Investigating the concept of knowledge does not inform us significantly about the phenomenon of knowledge itself. Therefore, the naturalistic proposal consists of accessing knowledge, as any other physical phenomenon, through an empirical approach of measuring knowledge by environmental stimuli, behavioral patterns, and other factors conditioned by the information requirements that the environment places before epistemic agents.

We propose cognitive ethology as one such approach that can satisfy the methodological conditions that naturalistic epistemology poses to knowledge (Kornblith, 2002). The study of animal behavior, in its natural habitat, is the basis from which cognitive ethology concludes human cognition (knowledge and belief process formation). If we reverse this methodological prism and take a retrospective step back, we could discover a great deal about animal cognition. I hypothesize that animals also possess doxastic states, such as belief. This paper aims to determine the possibility of whether animals can have the knowledge and to investigate this I have to examine the specific contexts in which we could attribute knowledge to animals.

Epistemic games (Shaffer, 2006) are a suitable exploratory frame for examining the context in which we can attribute knowledge to animals. Epistemic games are based on Wittgenstein’s language games, only in a broader sense as they refer to epistemic communities and agents within them (Wittgenstein, 1953). We can imagine the game, in which man tries to teach his dog to fetch a ball, as one epistemic game with all of the epistemic conditions that that game imposes.

So, what does Lassie knows?
Abstract:
It is not that the religious worldview in Europe has been completely rejected. On the other hand, the fact is that the scientific worldview (with accompanying philosophical assumptions), currently dominant in the West, is at least non-religious, if not anti-religious. For example, atheism or agnosticism presents themselves as “scientific positions”, opposed to religious faith. The new worldview also manifests itself in what is taught in the Western schools and universities. It is not only about the religious worldview itself, of course, but also about the rejection of all kinds of idealism, spiritualism, supernaturalism, belief in the value of mystical experience etc. These paths of searching for truth belong - since the 19th century, I think - to the European past, at least as far as mainstream European intellectual culture is concerned.
Abstract:

For better or worse, understanding the relationship between the felt and the measured phenomenon, what Joseph Levine called the *explanatory gap*, is the crux of the cognitive scientific project. It is phenomenology’s appeal to first-personal experience that has made it a promising interlocutor, but it is those very same features that seem to put it at odds with regards to the standards of scientific practice. There have been projects, like Dennett’s Heterophenomenology or Varela’s Neurophenomenology to *naturalize* phenomenology to render it useful within the cognitive scientific context, but here descriptive experiential reports are often given a merely complementary or illustrative role in the empirical endeavor and it can be questioned what progress is made toward closing the explanatory gap. In my talk, I want to show how previous attempts of naturalization seem to skew or reduce what phenomenology’s potential might be. Further, I will introduce what has been called the *naturalist* and the *transcendentalist objection* to applying phenomenology to re-evaluate what conditions need to be met for a meaningful application of phenomenological insight to the cognitive sciences, and to discuss whether Shaun Gallagher’s suggestion to *frontload* phenomenology fits the bill.
Abstract:

“Natural” does not mean “material”, as we were taught by Plato and Aristotle, for whom many natural entities are spiritual (i.e. immaterial). Thus ‘naturalism’ is not synonymous with ‘materialism’ and, unlike materialism, is not opposed to ‘spiritualism’. In fact, the only logical opposition, founded in the millennial tradition of the three Abrahamic religions, is between ‘naturalism’ and ‘supernaturalism’. Nature is that of creatures, supernature is that of the creator God. A Naturalist philosophy thinks that this universe is self-founded and apart from natural causes nothing else exists. A philosophy such as that of Aquinas, Ibn-Sina, or Maimonides, on the other hand, holds that the universe has an ontological status as a creature which requires the existence of a creator, i.e. something ‘supra-natural’.

The 20th century theologian Henri De Lubac’s argues that for medieval thinkers there was one and only one concrete order of history, the one in which God had made humanity for himself, and in which human nature had thus been created only for a single destiny, which was supernatural. But in the Renaissance some theologians introduced the idea of human nature as “a closed and sufficient whole” and this system of ‘pure nature’ became mainstream in the 20th century.

But – against this – Henri De Lubac maintains the fundamental idea that there are no two parallel realities, namely the ‘natural’ and the ‘supernatural’. A Christian or a Jew or a Muslim can say that everything is natural (grace consists entirely in the external and internal events of the historical world), and he can also say that everything is supernatural (every spatiotemporal element of the world is created, i.e. sustained in existence by God).
Neither Individuals nor Relations? A Criticism of Ontic Structural Realism from a Naturalistic Stance

Justin Peterson Holder
University of Oxford
Wed, March 09th, 2022
15:45–16:15 (Tehran) / 12:15–12:45 (GMT)

Abstract:
This paper presents a criticism of ontic structural realism (OSR) from a naturalistic stance. The following are three theses which I take all OSRists to accept:

Epistemic Thesis: We have represented the approximate structures of certain real, unobservable systems in the models of our best scientific theories.

Eliminative Thesis: Belief in the existence of ontologically fundamental individuals with intrinsic nature is poorly motivated and should be abandoned.

Ontological Thesis: The structures of real systems are ultimately realised by relations alone.

The Ontological Thesis is what defines OSR as a positive metaphysical thesis on the nature of reality. But I will argue that, while there may be good reasons to accept the Epistemic and Eliminative Theses, we do not have good reasons to believe the Ontological Thesis. My strategy is to show that the Epistemic and Eliminative Theses are consistent with a fourth thesis which contradicts the Ontological Thesis; namely, the Neither-Nor Thesis:

Neither-Nor Thesis: The structures of real systems are ultimately realised neither by individuals and their relations nor by relations alone.

On the Neither-Nor Thesis, whatever ultimately realises the structures of real systems cannot be adequately captured by human conceptual schema. From a naturalistic stance, I argue that there is no evident reason to think that the Ontological Thesis is true and the Neither-Nor Thesis is false. My goal is not to convince the reader that the Neither-Nor Thesis is true, but rather to convince them that belief in the Ontological Thesis is not appropriately motivated. Having accepted the Epistemic and Eliminative Theses, then, we ought to believe that the disjunction of the Ontological and Neither-Nor Theses is true. In that case, the final analysis is that we don’t know what ultimately realises the structure of real systems and have returned to an epistemic form of structural realism.
Why Must an Adequate Naturalism Accommodate Substantial Normative Notions?

Ozer Turker
University of Western Ontario

Abstract:
Both scientific and nonscientific varieties of naturalism reject that values, reasons and meanings understood as normative standards appear as part of the content of causal explanations and are objects of scientific research. This view follows from the hermeneutic assumption that substantive normative categories comprising the human life can only do some sort of interpretive work and thus cannot be part of scientific explanations. However, with the advent of modelbased social science, this assumption has been losing its force. In this paper, I argue that if science is the only activity that can give a complete understanding of the human world, the proper version of naturalism must accommodate the explanatory significance of normative standards. To this end, I will draw on three agent-based model studies in addiction science to illustrate how norms that derive from interpretation of the values, action reasons, and life meanings of substance users at the individual level are indispensable to the explanatory social mechanisms that dynamically generate the explanandum phenomenon. Then I expand on this argument to show that the dominant versions of naturalism either contain a contradiction or are trivial. Given this surprising conclusion, we would surely need a more adequate conception of naturalism that can seriously consider the normativity of the human world.
Introducing Nietzsche’s Naturalized Metaphysics

Justin Remhof
Old Dominion University

Wed, March 09th, 2022
17:30–18:00 (Tehran) / 14:00–14:30 (GMT)

Abstract:
The topic of naturalized metaphysics in Nietzsche stands radically underexplored in the literature on Nietzsche, naturalism, and metaphysics alike. I aim to show that Nietzsche endorses a naturalized conception of metaphysics which holds that metaphysics must be continuous with the sciences. I introduce Nietzsche’s naturalized metaphysics by suggesting that there are examples in the texts where he uses metaphysical methods and embraces metaphysical positions which are continuous with the sciences. This should expand how we might best understand Nietzsche’s relation to metaphysics, naturalism, and science.
Abstract:
There is a consensus among philosophers of science that theoretical virtues play a crucial role in theory choice in science. But can these virtues be used, justifiably and fruitfully, in *metaphysical* theory choice too? To answer this question, first we need to see under what conditions theoretical virtues are truth-conducive in science. Second, we should see if these conditions can be fulfilled in the context of metaphysics. By adopt a promising version of scientific realism called semi-realism, I argue that to deem a scientific theory true, it should satisfy three conditions: (i) it should exemplify theoretical virtues *collectively*; (ii) theoretical virtues of the theory should be exemplified *in high degrees*; and (iii) Some *empirical* theoretical virtues should be exemplified. Then I argue that it is possible to use theoretical virtues in metaphysics if it can be shown that metaphysical theories can exemplify the three theoretical virtues of empirical fit, external consistency with well-established scientific theories, and explanatory power in a particular way: our metaphysical theories should aim to explain aspects of the world *as described by our scientific theories*, rather than as we find in our everyday experiences and common-sense intuitions.
Abstract:
From the time it was published in Principia Ethica, Moore’s open question argument (OQA) has received a variety of responses in the literature of ethics and moral philosophy during 20th and 21st centuries. Moore’s original argument says that it can provide sufficient philosophical evidence for the claim that moral properties can’t be reduced to natural properties. According to Moore’s original articulation of OQA “if I am asked ‘what is good’ my answer is that good is good, and that is the end of the matter. Or if I am asked ‘how is good to be defined’ my answer is that it cannot be defined, and that is all I have to say about it” (Moore 1993, p.58). There were some early philosophical reaction to the first version of Moore’s argument against ethical naturalism. Among these reactions, the objection based upon Moore’s conflation between intension and extension perhaps should be considered as the most important one. According to this objection, Moore wants to reject the ethical naturalism on the basis of rejecting the identity of the “good” and “X”. “Water” and “H2O” are usually considered as a classic example for two terms with the same extension. The philosophical important point is that if X and Y are co-extensive, you cannot logically conclude that they are co-intensive too. Water and H2O are co-extensive and have two different intentions at the same time. According to this objection, the only conclusion that can be derived from the first version of Moore’s argument is that the “good” and “X” are not co-intensive while Moore, mistakenly, concludes that they are not coextensive too. In this paper, after describing Moore’s original argument, I’ll focus on the objection to the argument which is based upon Moore’s conflation between intension and extension and then assess the ways in which Moore’s conclusion may be defended.
چکیده:

اجازه به‌دهید اعتقاد داشتن، تردید کردن، خیال کردن و نظری این‌ها را "حالات ذهنی" بنامیم. مثالاً اعتقاد به اینکه کوه دماوند بزرگ‌ترین آتشفشان آسیاست یک حالت ذهنی است. این حالت ذهنی درباره کوه دماوند است. با تردید در اینکه ضحاک در دانه کوه دماوند سکنی دارد یک حالت ذهنی دیگر است. حالت ذهنی درباره ضحاک است. درباره چیزی بودن را، در اینجا، اولاً به حالت ذهنی نسبت می‌دهیم، ونه مثالاً به کلمات. چیزهایی که حالتی ذهنی درباره آنها هستند را "محول‌های حالات ذهنی" می‌نامیم. و "درباره‌گی" را به نحو موضوع تری نیز به کار برد. نوعی از این موثرت را "محول‌های راسالی" می‌نامند؛ در مقابل، آن چیزی که این محولت را مشخص یا معین می‌کند "مضمون فرگها" می‌نامند. این سخنرانی مروری است بر بعضی دیدگاه‌های طبیعی‌گرایانه درباره دیدگاه‌گی درباره حالات ذهنی. منظور از "دیدگاه‌های طبیعی‌گرایانه" دیدگاه‌هایی است که تلاش می‌کنند تا با توسیع به روش‌ها و هیپاتیکی‌ها در علوم چیستی و جسمیتی دیدگاه‌گی حالات ذهنی را توضیح دهند. در دهه‌ای اخیر حاضر، این دیدگاه‌ها به‌طور معمول به چهار گروهی تقسیم می‌شود: "سایکو سمنتیکس"، "روش میلیکان" و "اینفورمیشن سمنتیکس" (معناشناسی روان‌شناسی). سپس، به اجمال به دیدگاه‌های درختنی اشاره می‌کنیم که بر اساس آن محولت باشد. در دیدگاه فودور، "پایو سمنتیکس"، "روش میلیکان" و "اینفورمیشن سمنتیکس" (معناشناسی اطلاعاتی) فرد درتسکی. سعی خواهیم کرد که طرح کلی‌ای از این نظریات ترسیم کنیم. این تلاش می‌کنیم توضیح بدیدم چگونه قرار‌گرفتیم که باید دیدگاه فودور به دیدگاه درتسکی و "کارگرد دانت‌لیشن‌ناتی" یک سیستم شناختی توضیح داده شود. در مراحل بعد به دیدگاه درتسکی اشاره کرده‌ایم که بر اساس آن محولت باشد. در "جربان اطلاعاتی" و "کارگرد دانت‌لیشن‌ناتی" آن تبدیل می‌گردد. بعضی از نقاط قوت و ضعف این نظریات را برخوایش شمرده و اگر زمان اجازه بدهد نگاهی کوتاه‌یی که یکی از دیدگاه‌های رقیب خواهیم انداد.
بیانات واقع‌گرایی صورت‌شناختی مدعیاند که واقع‌گرایی‌شان را بهترین نظریه‌های علمی پیشنهاد می‌کنند. چنان‌که اگر معلوم شود نظریه‌های مذکور این نوع واقع‌گرایی را برپا کرده، آنگاه این نوع واقع‌گرایی ضعیف می‌شود. به عباراتی، واقع‌گرایی صورت‌شناختی هستی‌شناختی تجزی طبیعت‌گرایانه محسوب می‌شود. اما این قید باعث شده که واقع‌گرایی صورت‌شناختی هستی‌شناختی دچار تحول شده با پیشنهاد بهترین نظریه‌های علمی‌سازگاری پیدا کند. مشخصاً، واقع‌گرایی صورت‌شناختی هستی‌شناختی کنونی شکل وجوهی به‌خود گرفته است. به‌نحوی که براساس آن ساختارهای عالی سرشنی وجوهی دارند. حالا بررسی این است وجوهی بودن ساختارها را تا چه میزان می‌توان با ارزیابی‌های ریاضی، فیزیکی نشان داد. در این ساختاری استدلال‌های شدید که نظریه‌های فیزیکی نه تنها می‌توانند بالقوگی و بالفعلی ساختارهای جهان را پاسخ‌پذیر نکنند، چه می‌توانند گذار از بالقوگی به بالفعلی یا همان صورورت ساختارها را نیز پاسخ‌پذیر نکنند.
آیا طبیعت گراوی روش‌شناختی موجه است؟

Is Methodological Naturalism Justified?

حامد بیکران بهشت
Hamed Bikaraan-Behesht
مرکز تحقیقات سیاست علمی کشور
شنبه، 14 اسفند 1400
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چکیده:
طبیعتگراویان روش‌شناختی بر این باورند که روش علمی (یا به طور کلی تر، مجموعه روش‌های تجربی یا پیشینی) تنها راه برای کسب معرفت در همه زمینه‌ها (حتی در فلسفه و علوم انسانی) است. اما فیلسوفان تحلیلی سنتی، نوعاً استفاده از روش علمی در فلسفه را تنها به این شرط مجاز می‌شمرند که ابتدا درستی آن مبتني بر روش‌های پیشینی فلسفه اولی نشان داده شود. یک استدلال ضد طبیعتگراویان روش‌شناختی که در آثار فلسفی چندان راپرت آود و تیموسون به طور تلویحی مطرح شده این است که طبیعتگراوی روش‌شناختی عملاً قابل توجیه نیست؛ توجیه آن یا به دور باطل مبتلا می‌شود وقتی طبیعتگراویان می‌خواهند آن را به روش علمی توجیه کنند) یا اساساً نامنسجم است (اگر طبیعتگراویان بخواهند آن را به روش‌های پیشینی فلسفی اولی توجیه کنند) در این ارائه این استدلال را نقد کرده و سپس نشان می‌دهم که وضعیت طبیعتگراوی از نظر توجیه تفاوتی با فلسفی اولی ندارد.
Abstract:

This article aims to defend the claim that if we reject that science is value-free, then we must also reject that values are independent of reality, and vice versa. In other words: science is value-laden iff values are science-laden. Therefore, arguments proposed against neutrality or value-freedom of science may also be applied in defending moral realism. Two arguments for this claim will be provided, one based on conformational holism, another based on anti-dogmatic nature of science. Finally it will be argued that among different forms of moral realism, ethical naturalism is the one that is better vindicated.

A sharp distinction between “is” and “ought”, or between “fact” and “value”, which is usually seen as Hume's legacy, was in a great part of 20th century popular among philosophers. At the end of the twentieth century, though, mainly because of gaining a better understanding of the social nature of scientific enterprise, belief in fact/value distinction and value-free science gradually weakened and forms of fusion and influence of the two domains were accepted.

Adherents of the Value-Free Ideal of science (VFI) admit that non-cognitive values play important roles in scientific enterprise, but they contend that only cognitive values can have a legitimate role in epistemic assessment of theories.

Nevertheless, serious objections have been recently raised against the VFI. The most compelling is the Inductive Risk Argument (IRA), which based on the underdetermination of theory by evidence, rules appealing to non-epistemic values in accepting a scientific hypothesis necessary.

But even if successful, inductive risk argument cannot fully undermine the VFI. To effectively discredit the VFI, one should show that appealing to non-epistemic values is not only inevitable, but also desirable. So rejecting the VFI arguably leads to accepting evidential roles for contextual values.

Now if values can be evidence for empirical theories, then empirical theories can also be evidence for our value judgments. For this, two arguments will be put up. One appeals to confirmational holism, and the other is based on anti-dogmatic nature of science.

Finally, the fact-dependence of values that results from value-ladenness of science may be counted as an argument in favor of moral realism. Among the different versions of moral realism, ethical naturalism is the one which is better supported. The reason is that it is only in ethical naturalism, and no non-naturalistic forms of ethical realism, that some regularity between natural and moral properties is assumed.
چکیده:
گروهی از فیلسوفان مسلمان، عمداً مشایخان مثل ابن سینا، در پی ارسطو بر (physicist) این رأی استوارند که فیلسوفان متقدّم یونانی، طبیعی مذهب (physicism) چنانکه ابن سینا آنها را مثالاً در کتاب شفای "طبیعیون" می‌خواند و در مقابل اش "الهیون" به تجلیل نام می‌برد که مرادش اصحاب مابعد الطبیعه هستند.
بر طبق این نگاه است که طرح تفکیک طبیعت (physics) و مابعد الطبیعه (metaphysics) در فلسفه ارسطو انداصته شد و رأی فیلسوفان پیش‌سقراطی مبنی بر این که یکی از موجودات طبیعی - مثل آب به نزد تالس یا آتش به نزد هرآکلیتوس - ماده‌المواد و اصل و مبدأ همه موجودات است، به درستی فهمیده نشد و لذا موجب شد آنان را به دیده‌تر تخفیف بنگردند.

در مقابل این گروه فیلسوفان، عارفان و حکمای اشراقی مسلمان نظر دیگری دارند که به مراد و منظور حکیم‌باستانی یونانی نزدیکتر است. تلقّی عارفان از (aletheia) طبیعت به عنوان حقيقة ظاهرشده هستی با تعبیر یونانیان از حقيقة و از موجودات طبیعی به عنوان مظاهر آن حقيقة، با آنچه حکم‌باستانی یونان از به معنی بالیدن و ظاهر شدن و از موجود به phuein (طبیعت) از ریشه‌ گر مراد می‌کردند، مشابهت بسیار دارد. hemenhin است رأی حکیم‌باستان اشراق سه‌ورودی که زبان یونانیان باستان درباره مبدأ و مشا طبیعی موجودات را زبانی مرموز (symbolic) می‌داند و فیلسوفان چون ارسطو و ابن سینا را عاجز از فهم این زبان.
آیا علم می‌تواند طبعیت گرایی فلسفی را به چالش بکشد؟
تأمّلی بر رابطه طبعیت گرایی فلسفی و روش‌شناسی

Can Science Challenge Philosophical Naturalism?

زهرا زرگر
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دانشگاه تربیت مدرس

چکیده:
طبیعت گرایی فلسفی شامل این ادعا است که در جهان تنها هویات طبیعی وجود دارند. این دیدگاه به وجود هویاتی فراطبیعی همچون روح، خداوند و ... رد می‌کند. در مناقشته میان طبعیت گرایی فلسفی و فراطبیعیتگرایی علاوه بر ادله فلسفی، علم نیز به عنوان زاویه ورود مورد استفاده قرار گرفته و چارچوب بحث را از پرداختن صرفًا فلسفی، به بهره‌های علمی-فلسفی تغییر داده است. در این مقاله به‌وسیله علم طبعیت گرایی فلسفی را به چالش بکشند یا نه؟ اهمیت این سوال از آنجایی است که مدافعان طبیعت گرایی فلسفی بر سر یک دوراهی قرار می‌دهد. اگر به این پرسش پاسخی منفی بدهند، علم دیگری تواناداری مشروطیت و منبعی قابل قبول برای داوری میان طبعیت گرایی و فراطبیعیتگرایی باشد. پوانت‌های بی‌شماری در مورد توانایی علم به عنوان داوری علمی نقش ویژه‌ای کرد که برای هر دو طرف به عنوان موثر و معنی‌دار باشد. اگر امکان داشته باشد برای هر دو طرف بتواند هم مؤید و هم چالش برانگیز باشند، اگر امکان چالش برانگیزی علم برای یکی از طرفین منتفی باشد، تأیید می‌شود که علم در این مفاهیم علمی علمی منبع مهمی برای ایجاد شهود بی‌شماری سبب قرار گذاشته آنها از توجه منفی‌شبرده به ضرر طبعیت گرایی فلسفی است. اما از طرف دیگر، مثبتهای و پذیرش چالش برانگیزی نیز برای طبیعت گرایان مثبت‌النظری دارند. مهم‌ترین دلیل برای نفتی چالش برانگیزی علم برای طبیعت گرایی فلسفی، تعمیر به طبیعت گرایی روشن‌شناسی است. طبق طبیعتگرایی روشن‌شناسی استفاده از هویات، نروها و باورها با ساختار و ارتباط گرایانه در علم مجاز نیست. تعهد به روش طبیعتگرایانه در علم موجب می‌شود بیان‌های علمی مهم‌ها و مؤید طبیعتگرایی فلسفی باشد. در نتیجه امکان به چالش کشیده شدن طبیعتگرایی فلسفی و تسویه علمی و مشروطیت داوری علم در مناقشه قبوق منتفی می‌شود. تناها راه برای اجتناب از این نتیجه، کنار گذاشتن طبیعتگرایی روشن‌شناسی است؛ به این معنا که محدود بودن علم به هویات، نروها و باورها از طبیعت گرایی این روش ندارد، خوشا شانی طبیعتگرایان فلسفی و حتی برخی دیگر ا(devotions) نیست. اما به نظر مسند تناها در این صورت علمی می‌تواند استقلال فلسفی داشته و بهره‌برداری از آن در مناقشه طبیعتگرایی- فراطبیعیتگرایی مشروط باشد.
چکیده:
شکاکیت در امکان معرفت، چالش دیرپایی است که فلسفه هرگز نتوانسته است به تمام و کمال، از آن رها کند؛ از این رو در طول تاریخ، همواره فیلسوفان بسیاری برآن شدهاند تا به نوعی این چالش مقابل ما و امکان معرفت دفاع کنند. اعتمادگرایی یکی از نظریات برون گرای توجیه است که برخی از معرفت‌شناسان آن را در مقابل با شکاکیت، توانمند یافته‌اند. در این میان، اوین پلنتینگا معتقد است که تويل به اعتمادپذیری قوای ادراکی به منظور اجتناب از شکاکیت، تنها در صورتی واقعی به مقصد خواهد بود که با طبیعی گرایی، ترکیب شود. مراد وی این است که پذیرش اعتمادپذیری قوای ادراکینسان، در تولید باورهای صادق، منوط به اجتناب از طبیعی گرایی می‌باشد. و اعتمادپذیری و نظریه تکامل را توجه دارد که به تولید باورهای صادق و کسی که طبیعی گرایی و نظریه تکامل را هم می‌پذیرد، در خصوص اعتمادپذیری فراوان به‌ایران، با احتمال پایینی مواجه است که به هیچ وجه تضمین گرداندن معرفت نخواهد بود و این عدم تضمین، سبب می‌گردد تا در نهایت، طبیعی گرایی مغلوب افکارهای داشته باشد و گزارة مرکب از صدق طبیعی گرایی و تکامل گرایی، خودشکن شد و پذیرش آن عقلا امکان‌پذیر نباشد. به اعتقاد پلنتینگا اعتمادپذیری قوای ادراکی قناعت نمی‌کند و از این‌رو شکاکیت و تغییر دیدگاه پلنتینگا پرداخته می‌شود و سپس پاره‌ای از نقدهای وارد شده بر آن، بررسی خواهد شد.
همایش بین‌المللی طبیعی‌گرایی فلسفی و چالش‌های آن

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